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1 Introduction
Given a real-valued Markov process (Xt)t≥0 with X0 = x, a two-player Dynkin game [13] is
defined by the following cost functionals:
Ji(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−rτiGi(Xτi)1{τi<τj} + e
−rτjLi(Xτj )1{τi≥τj}
]
, i = 1, 2, j 6= i. (1.1)
Here player i chooses a stopping time τi and the game is terminated at time τ1 ∧ τ2, with the
cost to player i equal to either Gi(Xτi) or Li(Xτi) (continuously discounted at the rate r > 0),
depending on who stops first. Player i aims to minimise the cost functional Ji(τ1, τ2;x), and
central questions are the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria. Despite the fundamen-
tal relevance of nonzero-sum Dynkin games, especially in modern economic theory, they have
received relatively little rigorous mathematical treatment and this has largely focused on the
existence of Nash equilibria rather than the structure of the corresponding stopping times.
With applications in mind we go beyond the question of existence of Nash equilibria in (1.1)
for a wide class of stochastic processes X found in optimisation problems. We identify sufficient
conditions on the problem data to yield the structure of the corresponding optimal stopping
times and exactly characterise the optimal stopping boundaries. Our method is to adapt the
geometric approach to optimal stopping originally introduced in [14] in a natural way to the pair
of cost functionals (1.1), and we also provide easily verified sufficient conditions for uniqueness
of the equilibrium.
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1.1 Background
Both in discrete and in continuous time, a large mathematical literature exists for the zero-sum
case of (1.1) when G1 = −G2 and L1 = −L2 (see, for example, [3], [4], [5], [9], [15], [25], [34],
[38], among others). It has found applications in mathematical finance especially in connection
to pricing of new American contingent claims, such as the Israeli options introduced by Kifer
[23] (see also [24]) or convertible bonds (see, e.g., [37] and references therein).
In the nonzero-sum setting, sufficient conditions have been provided in discrete time for the
existence of a Nash equilibrium by employing martingale methods and a fixed point theorem for
monotone mappings in [30]. In [28] the existence of an equilibrium is proved in the case of a game
with monotone rewards by making use of Tarski’s fixed point theorem, while equilibrium values
in a two-player nonzero-sum game have been constructed by backward induction in [32]. The
results of [28] are generalised in [33] by relaxing the monotonicity requirement on the rewards.
More recently it has been proved that two-player nonzero-sum games in discrete time admit an
ε-equilibrium in randomised stopping times [36].
In continuous time, both analytic and probabilistic methods have been employed to estab-
lish the existence of Nash equilibria in nonzero-sum Dynkin games. When the Markov process
(Xt)t≥0 is the solution to a stochastic differential equation (SDE) and the time horizon is fi-
nite, the seminal paper [6] reduces the problem of finding a Nash equilibirium to one of finding
a sufficiently regular solution to a quasi-variational inequality and the corresponding stopping
times are characterised in terms of hitting times to moving boundaries. The latter paper makes
intensive use of partial differential equation (PDE) methods and requires smooth bounded co-
efficients for the SDE. Quasi-variational inequalities were also used in [31] from a probabilistic
point of view, to study the existence of an equilibrium in games of symmetric Markov processes.
Among those papers employing fully probabilistic methods, the existence of Nash equilibrium
is shown in [16] using the general theory of stochastic processes. The existence of a quasi-Markov
Nash equilibrium (i.e. equilibria for a.e. initial condition of the underlying process) was shown by
Cattiaux and Lepeltier [8] using the potential theory of Ray-Markov processes. The existence of
Nash equilibria in a non-Markovian setting was proved more recently in [17] (generalisations to
the N-player case can be found in [18]) and a BSDE approach to nonzero-sum games of control
and stopping is presented in [22]. In [25] it is proven that every two-player nonzero-sum game in
continuous time admits an ε-equilibrium over randomised stopping times, thus generalising the
result in [36] (see also [26]). Finally, a notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed
strategies is introduced in [35].
1.2 Main results
In the present paper X is a weak solution of a stochastic differential equation with drift µ,
volatility σ and state space an interval I ⊂ R whose upper endpoint is natural, whereas the
lower one is either natural, exit or entrance (see for instance Ch. 2, pp. 18–20, of [7]). Examples
of such diffusions include Brownian motion, geometric Brownian motion, the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process and Bessel processes (depending on their parameters), plus related processes such as the
CIR (Cox-Ingersoll-Ross) and CEV (constant elasticity of variance) process.
We denote by LX the infinitesimal generator of X and work with the following natural
conditions on the problem data, which rule out equilibria which are either trivial or overly
complex. For i = 1, 2 we assume:
(a) The functions Li, Gi are continuous with Li < Gi, so that waiting is incentivised relative
to stopping for each player for each given value of the process X. Since we take a positive
discount rate r in (1.1) we also assume that Gi is strictly negative for at least one value
of X, so that stopping in finite time is incentivised relative to waiting indefinitely,
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(b) for any value of the process X at least one player has a running benefit from waiting, in
the sense that the cost functions Gi are sufficiently smooth (twice differentiable) and the
sets {x : (LX − r)G1(x) > 0} and {x : (LX − r)G2(x) > 0} are disjoint,
(c) the equation (LX − r)Gi(x) = 0 has a single root so that, for each player, the running
benefit from waiting changes sign at most once with respect to the value of the process X.
Beginning with natural boundaries (thus addressing for example Brownian motion, geometric
Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process), we establish that conditions (a)–(c) (plus
standard integrability assumptions) are sufficient for the existence of a Nash equilibrium, which
we characterise via a system of algebraic equations. The corresponding optimal stopping policies
are then both of threshold type and the smooth fit principle holds between the cost functional
Ji(τ1, τ2;x) and the payoff function Gi. While the payoff functions Li are not in general required
to be smooth, we provide easy to check sufficient conditions on Li, i = 1, 2 for uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium. In order to address examples of Bessel, CIR and CEV processes we extend
these results to allow the lower endpoint to be either an exit or entrance boundary. Finally we
indicate in Appendix A.2 the extension to a state dependent discount factor; note that other
combinations of natural, exit and entrance boundaries may in principle also be addressed via
our approach (indeed this is immediate by symmetry when the lower boundary is natural).
Our work complements recent closely related work [1, 2]1 using probabilistic methods: we
establish results for a wide variety of stochastic processes used in applications under a natural
condition on the payoff functions Gi (see Assumption 3.3) while in [1, 2] both endpoints of I are
absorbing for the process X and a number of classes of payoff functions are explored. At the level
of methodology we adapt to Dynkin games a constructive solution method for optimal stopping
problems which is also originally due to Dynkin [14], Chapter 3, and proceeds by studying the
geometry of the problem. The potential value in having this alternative, constructive approach
is discussed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2.1 we introduce the dynamics and
recall some properties of linear diffusions, and the nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping is
described in Section 2.2. The construction and characterisation of Nash equilibria is provided
in Section 3 for the different combinations of diffusion boundary behaviours. In Appendix we
provide the generalisation of our results to state dependent discount factors and we also give
details on the solution of two optimal stopping problems needed in Section 3.
2 Setting
2.1 The underlying diffusion
Let (Ω,F ,P) denote a complete filtered probability space equipped with a filtration F = (Ft)t≥0
under usual hypotheses, W = (Wt)t≥0 a one dimensional standard Brownian motion adapted to
F and X = (Xt)t≥0 a continuous adapted process with values in an open interval I ⊆ R. The
triple (Ω,F ,P),F, (X,W ) is a weak solution (if it exists) of the stochastic differential equation
(SDE)
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, X0 = x ∈ I, (2.1)
for some Borel functions µ : R→ R and σ : R→ R to be specified (see Assumption 2.1 below).
To account for the dependence of X on its initial position, from now on we shall write Xx where
appropriate and Px to refer to the probability measure such that Px(·) = P(·|X0 = x), x ∈ I.
Throughout the paper we will equivalently use the notations E[f(Xxt )] and Ex[f(Xt)], f : R→ R
Borel-measurable and integrable, to refer to expectations under the measure Px.
1These manuscripts became available during the final drafting of the present paper.
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We denote by I the closure of I and we assume that I = (x, x) ⊆ R with x and x (not
necessarily finite) boundary points for X. We assume that the upper boundary point x is natural,
whereas the lower one x is either natural, exit or entrance (see for instance Ch. 2, pp. 18–20,
of [7] for a characterisation of the boundary behaviour of diffusions). For the coefficients of the
SDE (2.1) we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The functions µ and σ are continuous in I with σ2 > 0 in I. Moreover∫ y+εo
y−εo
1 + |µ(ξ)|
|σ(ξ)|2 dξ < +∞, for some εo > 0 and every y ∈ I.
Assumption 2.1 guarantees that (2.1) has a weak solution that is unique in the sense of
probability law (up to a possible explosion time, cf. [21], Ch. 5.5).
We will now recall some basic properties of diffusions. We refer the reader to Ch. 2 of [7] for
a detailed exposition. Under Assumption 2.1, the diffusion process X is regular in I; that is, if
τ(z) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = z} one has Px(τ(z) < ∞) > 0 for every x and z in I so that the state
space cannot be decomposed into smaller sets from which X cannot exit. The continuity of µ
and σ imply that the scale function has density
S′(x) := exp
(
−
∫ x
xo
2µ(ξ)
σ2(ξ)
dξ
)
, x ∈ I,
for some reference point xo ∈ I, and the speed measure has density
m′(x) :=
2
σ2(x)S′(x)
, x ∈ I.
Denoting by (
LXu
)
(x) :=
1
2
σ2(x)u′′(x) + µ(x)u′(x), x ∈ I
the infinitesimal generator of X, under Assumption 2.1 there always exist two linearly indepen-
dent, strictly positive solutions of the ordinary differential equation LXu = ru, r > 0, satisfying
a set of boundary conditions based on the boundary behaviour of X (see, e.g., pp. 18–19 of [7]).
These functions span the set of solutions of LXu = ru, r > 0, and are uniquely defined up to
multiplication if one of them is required to be strictly increasing and the other one to be strictly
decreasing. We denote the strictly increasing solution ψr and the strictly decreasing one φr. For
x, y ∈ I and τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y} one has
Ex
[
e−rτ(y)
]
=

ψr(x)
ψr(y)
, x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
, x > y.
(2.2)
Also, it is well known that the Wronskian
W :=
ψ′r(x)φr(x)− φ′r(x)ψr(x)
S′(x)
, x ∈ I, (2.3)
is a positive constant and we introduce the Green function
r(x, y) := W−1 ·
{
ψr(x)φr(y), x ≤ y,
φr(x)ψr(y), x ≥ y.
For σ I := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt /∈ I} one has
E
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rtf(Xxt )dt
]
=
∫
I
f(y)r(x, y)m′(y)dy, x ∈ I, (2.4)
Nonzero-Sum Dynkin Games 5
for any continuous real function f such that the integrals are well defined. Moreover the following
useful equations hold for any x < a < b < x (cf. par. 10, Ch. 2 of [7]):
ψ′r(b)
S′(b)
− ψ
′
r(a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
ψr(y)m
′(y)dy,
φ′r(b)
S′(b)
− φ
′
r(a)
S′(a)
= r
∫ b
a
φr(y)m
′(y)dy. (2.5)
2.2 The nonzero-sum Dynkin game
In the setting of Section 2.1, consider now the following two-player nonzero-sum game of optimal
stopping. Denoting
T := {τ : τ is an F-stopping time and τ ≤ σI},
player i aims to minimise the cost functional J1(τ1, τ2;x) in (1.1) by optimally choosing their
F-stopping time τi.
Definition 2.2. For x ∈ I we say that a couple (τ∗1 , τ∗2 ) ∈ T × T is a Nash equilibrium for the
two-player nonzero-sum game of optimal stopping if and only if{ J1(τ∗1 , τ∗2 ;x) ≤ J1(τ1, τ∗2 ;x), ∀ τ1 ∈ T ,
J2(τ∗1 , τ∗2 ;x) ≤ J2(τ∗1 , τ2;x), ∀ τ2 ∈ T .
(2.6)
We also say that vi(x) := Ji(τ∗1 , τ∗2 ;x) is the value of the game for the i-th player relative to the
equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper we will be concerned with equilibria attained by hitting times of X
to suitable sets. We introduce the following classes of functions:
Definition 2.3. Let A be the class of real valued functions H ∈ C2(I) such that
lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣H
φr
∣∣∣(x) = 0, lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣H
ψr
∣∣∣(x) = 0 (2.7)
and E
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rt
∣∣h(Xxt )∣∣dt] <∞ (2.8)
for all x ∈ I and with h(x) := (LXH − rH)(x). We denote by A1 (respectively A2) the set of
all H ∈ A such that h is strictly positive (resp. negative) on (x, xh) and strictly negative (resp.
positive) on (xh, x) for some xh ∈ I with lim infx→x h(x) > 0 (resp. < 0) and lim supx→x h(x) <
0 (resp. > 0).
Remark 2.4. The cost functions Gi of (1.1) will be drawn from these classes. For natural and
entrance boundaries we have φr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↓ x and ψr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↑ x in (2.7), so the
classes are not overly restrictive for applications. It is possible to relax (2.7) to some extent in
our approach, and this is done in Section 3.3 in the case of exit boundaries. We also note that
all the results in this paper remain true if in the definition of A the regularity of H is weakened
by requiring H ∈W 2,∞loc (I).
Before closing this section we provide some explicit formulae for functions in A which will
prove useful in the next sections. If H ∈ A (see Definition 2.3) we can apply Itoˆ’s formula (and
a standard localization argument) to obtain
H(x) = −E
[ ∫ σI
0
e−rth(Xxt )dt
]
, x ∈ I. (2.9)
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Then applying representation (2.4) we get the equivalent expression
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy + ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy
]
(2.10)
and straightforward calculations also give(H
φr
)′
(x) = −F
′
r(x)
W
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy. (2.11)
3 Construction of Nash equilibria
In this section we prove our main results, i.e. existence and then sufficient additional conditions
for uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of threshold type for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game of
Section 2.2. Moreover we provide an explicit characterisation of the optimal thresholds in terms
of a system of two algebraic equations in two unknowns. We begin in Section 3.1 under the
assumption that the endpoints x < x of I are natural for X, considering an entrance lower
boundary x in Section 3.2 and an exit lower boundary in Section 3.3.
3.1 The case of natural boundaries
The results in this section are proved under the assumption that the endpoints of I are both
natural for X. For the sake of completeness, recall that a boundary point ξ is natural for a
diffusion process if it is both non-entrance and non-exit. That is, ξ cannot be a starting point
for the process and it cannot be reached in finite time (cf. for instance [7], Ch. 2, p. 15). For x
and x natural boundary points one also has (see par. 10, Sec. 2 of [7])
lim
x↓x
ψr(x) = 0, lim
x↓x
φr(x) =∞, lim
x↑x
ψr(x) =∞, lim
x↑x
φr(x) = 0, (3.1)
lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0, lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= −∞, lim
x↑x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
=∞, lim
x↑x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0. (3.2)
As in [11], eq. (4.6), we define the strictly increasing function
Fr(x) :=
ψr(x)
φr(x)
, x ∈ I, (3.3)
together with its inverse F−1r (y), y > 0, and for any continuous real function H we set
Hˆ(y) :=
{ (
H
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y), y > 0,
0, y = 0.
(3.4)
We now relate (3.4) to the classes A1 and A2 of Section 2.2.
Lemma 3.1. Let H ∈ A1 (respectively A2) and set yˆ := Fr(xh), h(x) := (LX − r)h(x) and Hˆ
as in (3.4). Then Hˆ:
i) is convex (resp. concave) on [0, yˆ) and concave (resp. convex) on (yˆ,∞),
ii) satisfies Hˆ(0+) = 0 and Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞ (resp. +∞);
iii) has a unique global minimum (resp. maximum) at some y ∈ [0, yˆ) and limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = +∞
(resp. −∞); hence it is monotonic increasing (resp. decreasing) on (yˆ,+∞).
Nonzero-Sum Dynkin Games 7
Proof. Assume first that H ∈ A1. i) From Section 6, p. 192 in [11] we know that Hˆ is strictly
convex if and only if2 h > 0, whereas Hˆ is strictly concave if and only if h < 0. Therefore,
we have that Hˆ is convex on [Fr(x), yˆ), and concave on (yˆ, Fr(x)). Note that Fr(x) = 0 and
Fr(x) = +∞ due to (3.1) and the limit at zero of Hˆ is verified from the definition of A. If we
now show that
(a) lim inf
y↑∞
Hˆ(y) = +∞, and (b) lim
y↓0
Hˆ ′(y) = −∞, (3.5)
we can then conclude parts ii) and iii).
First we prove (a) above. By the definition of A1, for each given δ > 0 there exists εδ > 0
such that h(z) ≤ −εδ for any z ∈ [xh + δ, x). Moreover, for any x ∈ [xh + δ, x), (2.10) implies
H(x) = −W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ xh+δ
x
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz + φr(x)
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
+ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
]
(3.6)
≥ −W−1
[
φr(x)Cδ − φr(x)εδ
∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z)dz − εδψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz
]
with Cδ :=
∫ xh+δ
x ψr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz. Note that the last two terms above may be rewritten using
(2.5) as ∫ x
xh+δ
ψr(z)m
′(z)dz =
1
r
[
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
− ψ
′
r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
and ∫ x
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz = −1
r
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
.
Hence rearranging terms in (3.6) and recalling the expression for the Wronskian W in (2.3) we
get
H(x) ≥ −W−1
[
Cδ +
εδ
r
ψ′r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
φr(x) +
εδ
r
, (3.7)
which implies
H(x)
φr(x)
≥ −W−1
[
Cδ +
εδ
r
ψ′r(xh + δ)
S′(xh + δ)
]
+
εδ
rφr(x)
. (3.8)
Using (3.1) we obtain
lim inf
x↑x
H(x)
φr(x)
= +∞,
and since limy→∞ F−1r (y) = x, we also get
lim inf
y↑∞
Hˆ(y) = lim inf
y↑∞
(H
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y) = +∞
and (a) is proved.
To prove (b) let y = Fr(x) < Fr(xh − δ) for some δ > 0, recall (2.11) and note that since
H ∈ A1 we have
Hˆ ′(y) =− 1
W
[ ∫ x
xh−δ
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz +
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz
]
(3.9)
≤− 1
W
[
Cδ + εδ
∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz
]
2Although this is a well known result we thought that an unfamiliar reader may benefit from a proof of this
fact, which we account for in Appendix A.1.
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for some εδ > 0 and with Cδ :=
∫ x
xh−δ φr(z)h(z)m
′(z)dz. Now using (2.5) we also obtain
Hˆ ′(y) ≤ −W−1Cδ − εδ
W r
(φ′r(xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ) −
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
)
(3.10)
and then, letting y → 0 (equivalently x→ x) and using (3.2), we conclude Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞. The
case H ∈ A2 follows by exactly symmetric arguments.
For i = 1, 2 we set
Gˆi(y) :=
(Gi
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y), Lˆi(y) :=
(Li
φr
)
◦ F−1r (y), y > 0. (3.11)
Definition 3.2. For i = 1, 2, if Gi ∈ Ai then we define
1. gi(x) := (LX − r)Gi(x), x ∈ I;
2. xˆi the unique point at which the sign of gi(x) changes and we set yˆi := Fr(xˆi);
3. yi is the unique stationary point of Gˆi;
and if Li ∈ Ai then we define
1. `i(x) := (LX − r)Li(x), x ∈ I;
2. xˇi the unique point at which the sign of `i(x) changes and we set yˇi := Fr(xˇi);
3. y˜i is the unique stationary point of Lˆi.
We now give the key assumption in this paper, which will subsequently play the role of a
sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibria of threshold type.
Assumption 3.3. For i = 1, 2 we have Li, Gi ∈ C(I;R) with
Li < Gi on I, and inf
x∈I
Gi(x) < 0.
Further we require G1 ∈ A1, G2 ∈ A2 and xˆ1 < xˆ2 and we assume that
lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣Li
φr
∣∣∣(x) < +∞ and lim sup
x→x
∣∣∣Li
ψr
∣∣∣(x) < +∞ i = 1, 2. (3.12)
We are now ready to prove our main results. For u, v ≥ 0 let us introduce the functions
L1(u, v) := Gˆ1(u)− Lˆ1(v)− Gˆ′1(u)(u− v), (3.13)
L2(u, v) := Gˆ2(u)− Lˆ2(v)− Gˆ′2(u)(u− v), (3.14)
then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 3.4. Under Assumption 3.3 there exists a Nash equilibrium of the form
τ∗1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ x∗1}, τ∗2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x∗2}, (3.15)
with x∗1 := F−1r (y∗1) ∈ (x, xˆ1) and x∗2 := F−1r (y∗2) ∈ (xˆ2, x) and where the couple (y∗1, y∗2) ∈
(0, yˆ1)× (yˆ2,+∞) solves the system {
L1(y1, y2) = 0
L2(y2, y1) = 0.
(3.16)
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Proof. We proceed by constructing each player’s best reply to the other player’s stopping rule.
Denote
τ1(z) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ z} and τ2(z) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ z}, (3.17)
for any x, z ∈ I. By doing so we want to associate to P1 hitting times of half-intervals of the
form (x, z] and to P2 hitting times of half-intervals of the form [z, x). These are natural choices,
since it is easy to see that the i-th player will never stop in the set where gi is strictly negative
(cf. (2.9)). Indeed let us assume for example that x > xˆ1 and let P1 pick the suboptimal
stopping time τ1(xˆ1). Then, for any finite s > 0 and any stopping time σ chosen by P2, we
denote θ := σ ∧ τ1(xˆ1) ∧ s and obtain (see (1.1))
J1(τ1(xˆ1) ∧ s, σ) ≤ Ex
[
e−rθG1(Xθ)
]
= G1(x) + Ex
[ ∫ θ
0
e−rug1(Xu)du
]
< G1(x)
by using that L1 < G1 on I and Dynkin’s formula. Hence stopping at once costs to P1 more
than continuing at least until τ1(xˆ1) ∧ s regardless of P2’s stopping time σ.
1. Let us assume that P1 picks z ∈ (x, xˆ1) and decides to stop at τ1(z). Then P2 is faced
with an optimal stopping problem of the form
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG2(Xτ )1{τ<τ1(z)} + L2(z)e
−rτ1(z)1{τ≥τ1(z)}
]
, x ≥ z. (3.18)
This is a canonical problem whose solution is provided for completeness in Appendix A.3.1. It
is shown there that an optimal stopping time for P2 is τ2(x2) with x2 = x2(z) := F
−1
r (y2(ζ))
where ζ := F−1r (z) and y2(ζ) a solution (if it exists and it is unique) in (yˆ2,∞) of the equation
L2( · , ζ) = 0. (3.19)
We now show existence and uniqueness of a solution in (yˆ2,∞) to (3.19). Here ζ ∈ [0, yˆ1) is
given and fixed, and note that by concavity of Gˆ2 on (0, yˆ2) one has
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)(yˆ2 − ζ) <
∫ yˆ2
ζ
Gˆ′2(s)ds = Gˆ2(yˆ2)− Gˆ2(ζ),
and therefore (cf. (3.14))
L2(yˆ2, ζ) > Gˆ2(yˆ2)− Lˆ2(ζ)− Gˆ2(yˆ2) + Gˆ2(ζ) > 0,
because Gˆ2 > Lˆ2. Moreover,
∂
∂uL2(u, ζ) = −Gˆ′′2(u)(u−ζ) < 0 for any u ∈ (yˆ2,∞). For existence
of a unique y2(ζ) ∈ (yˆ2,∞) solving (3.19) it is sufficient to show L2(u, ζ)→ −∞ as u ↑ +∞. To
this end, first note that
sup
ζ∈(0,yˆ1)
∣∣Lˆ2(ζ)∣∣ ≤ C (3.20)
for some finite constant C > 0, thanks to continuity of L2 on I and (3.12). On the other hand,
for u0 > 0 sufficiently large we must have Gˆ
′
2(u) ≤ 0 for u ≥ u0 (see iii) of Lemma 3.1) and
therefore
lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)(u− ζ)
] ≤ lim
u→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u
]
. (3.21)
If the latter limit equals −∞ then also limu→∞ L2(u, ζ) = −∞ due to (3.20).
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Note that direct computation and (2.11) (with h = g2) give
Gˆ′2(u)u =
u
F ′r
(
F−1r (u)
)(G2
φr
)′(
F−1r (u)
)
= − u
W
∫ x
F−1r (u)
φr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt.
Setting u = Fr(s) for notational convenience and recalling the first equation in (3.11) and (2.10)
(with h = g2) we also get
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u = −W−1
∫ s
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt. (3.22)
Pick an arbitrary δ > 0 and recall the existence of εδ > 0 such that g2(y) ≥ εδ for y ∈ [xˆ2 +δ, x),
which follows from the definition of A2. Since we are looking at the limit as u→∞ (i.e. s→ x)
with no loss of generality we assume s > xˆ2 + δ and by using (2.5) we obtain
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u =−
1
W
[ ∫ xˆ2+δ
x
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt+
∫ s
xˆ2+δ
ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt
]
≤− εδ
Wr
(ψ′r(s)
S′(s)
− ψ
′
r(xˆ2 + δ)
S′(xˆ2 + δ)
)
− Cδ
W
(3.23)
where Cδ :=
∫ xˆ2+δ
x ψr(t)g2(t)m
′(t)dt. In the limit as u → ∞ one has s = F−1r (u) → x and by
(3.2) we conclude that limu→∞
[
Gˆ2(u)− Gˆ′2(u)u
]
= −∞ and hence limu→∞ L2(u, ζ) = −∞.
Equation (3.19) is the geometric version of the so called smooth-fit equation. From the
arbitrariness of z ∈ (x, xˆ1) and a simple application of the implicit function theorem we obtain
that the map z 7→ x2(z) is continuous on (x, xˆ1) (or equivalently y2( · ) ∈ C([0, yˆ1))) (see, e.g.,
Th. 10.2.1 at p. 270 of [12]).
2. In a completely symmetric way we now look at the case where P2 picks z ∈ (xˆ2, x) and
decides to stop at τ2(z). Then P1 is faced with an optimal stopping problem of the form
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ2(z)} + L1(z)e
−rτ2(z)1{τ≥τ2(z)}
]
, x ≤ z (3.24)
whose standard method of solution is illustrated in Appendix A.4. An optimal stopping time for
P1 is τ1(x1) with x1 = x1(z) := F
−1
r (y1(ζ)) where ζ := F
−1
r (z) and y1(ζ) is the unique solution
in (0, yˆ1) of the equation
L1( · , ζ) = 0, (3.25)
and with L1 as in (3.13). A proof of the existence of such a solution can be obtained following
arguments similar to those employed for equation (3.19) above. Notice however that here we
need extra care when using this argument as in fact (3.25) only holds if y1(ζ) > 0. However this
is guaranteed in this setting by observing that Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞ (see Lemma 3.1).
Again, the map z 7→ x1(z) is continuous on [xˆ2, x) (or equivalently y1( · ) ∈ C([yˆ2,+∞))) by
the implicit function theorem and arbitrariness of z.
3. The optimal stopping times in parts 1 and 2 above determine each player’s best reply to
the other player’s stopping rule, provided that the latter is of threshold type. To prove that a
Nash equilibrium exists in this class of stopping times we now need to prove that it is possible
to find x < x∗1 < x∗2 < x such that both the following hold:
i) τ1(x
∗
1) is optimal for P1, given that P2 stops on hitting [x
∗
2, x) (i.e. at τ
∗
2 (x
∗
2)),
ii) τ2(x
∗
2) is optimal for P2, given that P1 stops on hitting (x, x
∗
1] (i.e. at τ
∗
1 (x
∗
1)).
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This is equivalent to finding an intersection point (x∗1, x∗2) for the curves z 7→ x1(z) and z 7→ x2(z),
which is in turn equivalent to establishing the fixed points x1(x2(x
∗
1)) = x
∗
1 and x2(x1(x
∗
2)) = x
∗
2.
For this it is convenient to use the transformed variables y1 and y2 along with L1 and L2.
For each ζ ∈ (yˆ2,+∞), part 2 above defines a unique y1(ζ) ∈ (0, yˆ1). We now seek y∗2 ∈
(yˆ2,+∞) such that L2(y∗2, y1(y∗2)) = 0 by analysing the map ζ 7→ L2(ζ, y1(ζ)) for ζ ∈ (yˆ2,+∞).
First we prove that L2(yˆ2, y1(yˆ2)) > 0. For this it suffices to note that Gˆ2 is strictly concave on
(0, yˆ2) (by Lemma 3.1) and hence
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)(yˆ2 − y1(yˆ2)) <
∫ yˆ2
y1(yˆ2)
Gˆ′2(s)ds (3.26)
since yˆ2 > yˆ1 > y1(yˆ2). The above implies (see (3.14))
L2(yˆ2, y1(yˆ2)) >Gˆ2(yˆ2)−
∫ yˆ2
y1(yˆ2)
Gˆ′2(s)ds− Lˆ2(y1(yˆ2)) = Gˆ2(y1(yˆ2))− Lˆ2(y1(yˆ2)) > 0. (3.27)
By continuity of G2, L2 and y1 we get L2( · , y1( · )) ∈ C([yˆ2,+∞)) and, if now we prove
that L2(ζ, y1(ζ)) → −∞ as ζ ↑ +∞, then we get existence of at least one root y∗2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞).
To this end, first note that supζ∈(yˆ2,∞)
∣∣Lˆ2(y1(ζ))∣∣ ≤ supξ∈(0,yˆ1) ∣∣Lˆ2(ξ)∣∣ ≤ C, for some finite
constant C > 0, thanks to continuity of L2 on I and (3.12). Then, we can employ arguments
analogous to those used in part 1 above to obtain (3.23) with u replaced by ζ and s replaced
by z := F−1r (ζ) (notice in particular that by arguing as in (3.21) we remove the dependence
on y1(ζ)). Hence there exists at least one y
∗
2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) such that L2(y∗2, y1(y∗2)) = 0 and the
couple y∗2 and y∗1 := y1(y∗2) is a solution of (3.16). Finally the stopping times (3.15) produce a
Nash equilibrium with x∗1 := F−1r (y∗1) and x∗2 := F−1r (y∗2).
The above theorem states that a Nash equilibrium exists, together with a couple (y∗1, y∗2)
solving (3.16) in a suitable domain. Now we show that any couple (y1, y2) solving (3.16) in
(0, yˆ1) × (yˆ2,+∞) may be used to construct stopping times that provide a Nash equilibrium.
Before providing the result it is convenient to recall that Gˆi(y) = (Gi/φr)(x) for any y = Fr(x)
and i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.5. Let Assumption 3.3 hold and let (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1)× (yˆ2,+∞) be a solution of
(3.16). Then for x ∈ I, xi := F−1r (yi), i = 1, 2 the couple
τˆ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ x1}, τˆ2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x2} (3.28)
is a Nash equilibrium. Moreover the functions
v1(x) :=

G1(x), x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x) + q1φr(x), x1 < x < x2,
L1(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.29)
and
v2(x) :=

L2(x), x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x) + q2φr(x), x1 < x < x2,
G2(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.30)
with
m1 :=
(G1/φr)(x1)− (L1/φr)(x2)
Fr(x1)− Fr(x2) , q1 :=
L1
φr
(x2)−m1Fr(x2), (3.31)
m2 :=
(G2/φr)(x2)− (L2/φr)(x1)
Fr(x2)− Fr(x1) , q2 :=
L2
φr
(x1)−m2Fr(x1), (3.32)
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are the value functions of the two players, i.e. vi(x) = Ji(τ1, τ2;x), i = 1, 2. Also v1 ∈ C(I)
with v1 ∈W 2,∞loc (x, x2) and v2 ∈ C(I) with v2 ∈W 2,∞loc (x1, x).
Proof. 1. Let us start by proving the required regularity of vi. Consider first v1 and observe
that v1 ∈ C(I) and lies in C1(x, x2) if and only if analogous properties hold for v1/φr. Then
using that (y1, y2) = (Fr(x1), Fr(x2)) solves (3.16) and changing variables to y = Fr(x) for
computational convenience, it is matter of simple algebra to check the claims. We can proceed
in a similar way for v2.
2. By continuity one has v1 = G1 in (x, x1], v1 = L1 in [x2, x) and v2 = G2 in [x2, x), v2 = L2
in (x, x1]. The C
1 regularity (smooth fit) also implies v′1(x1+) = G′1(x1) and v′2(x2−) = G′2(x2).
Moreover we claim that the following variational inequalities hold:
(LX − r)vi(x) = 0, x1 < x < x2, i = 1, 2 (3.33)
(LX − r)v1(x) > 0, x < x < x1 (3.34)
(LX − r)v2(x) > 0, x2 < x < x (3.35)
vi ≤ Gi, x ∈ I, i = 1, 2. (3.36)
The first three expressions follow directly from the definition of vi and by the fact that x1 < xˆ1
and x2 > xˆ2. For the final inequality (the obstacle conditions) again we resort to the change
of variable inspired by the geometric approach. Notice indeed that vi ≤ Gi if and only if
(vi/φr) ≤ (Gi/φr). Set x = F−1r (y) and note that vˆ1(y) := (vi/φr) ◦ F−1r (y) is a straight
line in (y1, y2) and it is tangent to Gˆ1 in y1 by smooth fit. Moreover Gˆ1 is convex in (0, yˆ1),
it reaches its unique global minimum therein and it is concave in (yˆ1,+∞); then given that
vˆ1(y2) = Lˆ1(y2) < Gˆ1(y2) we must also have vˆ1 ≤ Gˆ1 on (y1, y2). Hence we get v1 ≤ G1 in
(x, x2) and v1 = L1 < G1 in [x2, x). Symmetric arguments hold for v2.
3. Given the regularity of vi, i = 1, 2 we can now apply Dynkin’s formula and use the above
variational characterisation to conclude the proof. Let σ be an arbitrary stopping time and τˆ2
as in (3.28), then using standard localisation arguments we get
v1(x) =Ex
[
e−r(σ∧τˆ2)v1(Xσ∧τˆ2)−
∫ σ∧τˆ2
0
e−rt(LX − r)v1(Xt)dt
]
≤Ex
[
e−rσG1(Xxσ )1{σ<τˆ2} + e
−rτˆ2L1(Xτˆ2)1{σ≥τˆ2}
]
= J1(σ, τˆ2;x) (3.37)
and analogously v2(x) ≤ J2(τˆ1, σ′;x) for another arbitrary σ′ and τˆ1 as in (3.28). If we now
pick σ = τˆ1 in (3.37) we obtain v1(x) = J1(τˆ1, τˆ2;x) whereas putting σ′ = τˆ2 we also get
v2(x) = J2(τˆ1, τˆ2;x), and hence the Nash equilibrium condition.
The next characterisation of the value functions v1 and v2 associated to a Nash equilibrium
is probabilistic and follows from arguments similar to those in the proof of Proposition 3.5.
Corollary 3.6. Let (τˆ1, τˆ2) be as in Proposition 3.5 and vi, i = 1, 2 the related values for the
two players. For i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j set
Y it := e
−rtvi(Xt), Git := e
−rtGi(Xt), Lit := e
−rtLi(Xt), t ≥ 0 (3.38)
then (Y it∧τˆj )t≥0 is a continuous sub-martingale, (Y
i
t∧τˆi∧τˆj )t≥0 is a continuous martingale, Y
i
t ≤ Git
for all t ≥ 0 and Y iτˆi∧τˆj = Giτˆi1{τˆi<τˆj} + Liτˆj1{τˆi≥τˆj}.
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From Proposition 3.5 our nonzero-sum game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and so we
now provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium of Theorem 3.4 is unique. First
it is convenient to consider the auxiliary problem
inf
τ∈T
E
[
e−rτG2(Xxτ )
]
, x ∈ I, (3.39)
which corresponds to the optimal stopping problem for P2 if P1 decides not to stop at all. From
standard theory and relying upon the geometry of Gˆ2 it is not hard to see that an optimal
stopping time for (3.39) is
τ∞2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x∞2 } (3.40)
for some x∞2 > xˆ2. In particular y∞2 := Fr(x∞2 ) can be determined as the unique y > yˆ2 solving
Gˆ′2(y)y − Gˆ2(y) = 0. The latter is the tangency condition for a straight line passing through
the origin and tangent to Gˆ2 at a point in (yˆ2,+∞). If a solution to that equation exists then
the convexity of Gˆ2 in (yˆ2,+∞) implies that it must be unique. For existence it is sufficient to
observe that
Gˆ′2(yˆ2)yˆ2 <
∫ yˆ2
0
Gˆ′2(s)ds = Gˆ2(yˆ2)
since Gˆ2 is strictly concave in (0, yˆ2). Recalling (3.23) we get limy→∞[Gˆ′2(y)y − Gˆ2(y)] = +∞
and therefore there exists a unique y∞2 ∈ (yˆ2,+∞) corresponding to (3.40).
Now we also consider the auxiliary problem
inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG1(Xτ )1{τ<τ∞2 } + e
−rτ∞2 L1(x∞2 )1{τ≥τ∞2 }
]
, x ∈ I, (3.41)
which corresponds to the optimal stopping problem P1 is faced with when P2 stops at τ
∞
2 .
Again an optimal stopping time for this problem is of the form τ∞1 := inf{t ≥ 0 Xt ≤ x∞1 } with
y∞1 := Fr(x∞1 ) ∈ (0, yˆ1) obtained as the unique solution to L1( · , y∞2 ) = 0 (see (3.13)). Since
Gˆ′1(0+) = −∞ there exists a unique such y∞1 by simple geometric considerations (see part 2 in
the proof of Theorem 3.4).
We recall the definitions of y˜i, i = 1, 2, from Definition 3.2 and we are now ready to state
our uniqueness result.
Theorem 3.7. Let Assumption 3.3 hold and let Li ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2. Let us also assume that
y˜2 > yˆ1 and that Gˆ
′
1(y
∞
1 ) < Lˆ
′
1(y
∞
2 ). Then there exists a unique couple (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) with x < x
∗
1 < xˆ1
and xˆ2 < x
∗
2 < x, such that (τ
∗
1 , τ
∗
2 ) as in (3.15) constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the game.
The couple (y∗1, y∗2) with y∗i := Fr(x
∗
i ), i = 1, 2 is then the unique solution of the system (3.16).
Proof. The main idea of the proof is to show that the maps ζ 7→ yi(ζ) found in the proof of The-
orem 3.4 are monotonic. We adopt the notation of the latter theorem and observe immediately
that under the additional regularity assumptions on Li we obtain yi( · ) ∈ C1(Oi) ∩ C(Oi) with
i = 1, 2 and O1 := (yˆ2,+∞)3, O2 := (0, yˆ1). In fact denoting by ∂kLi the partial derivative of
Li with respect to the k-th variable k = 1, 2, the implicit function theorem gives
y′i(ζ) = −
∂2Li
∂1Li (yi(ζ), ζ) =
Gˆ′i(yi(ζ))− Lˆ′i(ζ)
Gˆ′′i (yi(ζ))(yi(ζ)− ζ)
, ζ ∈ Oi, i = 1, 2. (3.42)
Since L2 ∈ A2, Lemma 3.1 implies that Gˆ′′2(y2(ζ))(y2(ζ) − ζ) > 0 for ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1) because
y2(ζ) > yˆ2 > ζ and Gˆ2 is convex on (yˆ2,+∞). By assumption y˜2 > yˆ1 and then Lˆ′2(ζ) > 0
3Here we take O1 := [yˆ2,+∞).
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for ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1); since Gˆ′2(y2(ζ)) < 0 as well then y′2(ζ) < 0 for ζ ∈ (0, yˆ1). It follows that y2( · )
decreases monotonically on (0, yˆ1) and from (3.39) we find that its maximum value is y2(0) = y
∞
2 .
Therefore it is now sufficient to analyse ζ 7→ y1(ζ) on the interval ζ ∈ (yˆ2, y∞2 ).
First we observe that since y1(ζ) ∈ (0, yˆ1) and ζ ∈ (yˆ2,+∞), item i) of Lemma 3.1 implies
Gˆ′′1(y1(ζ))(y1(ζ) − ζ) < 0. The sign of y′1(·) on (yˆ2, y∞2 ) is then determined by the sign the
numerator in (3.42). Note that τ∞1 provides the best reply of P1 when P2 stops at τ∞2 (see (3.41))
and therefore y∞1 = y1(y∞2 ) determines the optimal boundary in that case. Since Gˆ′1(y1(y∞2 )) =
Gˆ′1(y∞1 ) and we are assuming Gˆ′1(y∞1 ) < Lˆ′1(y∞2 ), then
y′1(y
∞
2 ) > 0. (3.43)
Let us now study the sign of ζ 7→ Gˆ′1(y1(ζ)) − Lˆ′1(ζ) in (yˆ2, y∞2 ). Assume that there exists
ζo1 ∈ (yˆ2, y∞2 ) such that Gˆ′1(y1(ζo1))− Lˆ′1(ζo1) = 0, then by definition of y1(·) this means that there
is a straight line which is at the same time tangent to Lˆ1, at ζ
o
1 , and to Gˆ1, at y1(ζ
o
1). Since Lˆ1
is convex for y < yˇ1 and Lˆ1 < Gˆ1 it is easy to see that we must have ζ
o
1 > yˇ1. Now we claim
that if such ζo1 exists, then it must be unique and
Gˆ′1(y1(ζ)) < Lˆ
′
1(ζ) and y
′
1(ζ) > 0 for ζ ∈ (yˆ2, ζo1) (3.44)
Gˆ′1(y1(ζ)) > Lˆ
′
1(ζ) and y
′
1(ζ) < 0 for ζ ∈ (ζo1 , y∞2 ). (3.45)
The latter contradicts (3.43) so if we prove (3.44) and (3.45) it will follow that y′1(·) is positive
on (yˆ2, y
∞
2 ).
To verify the claims we observe that
d
dζ
(
Gˆ′1(y1(ζ))− Lˆ′1(ζ)
)∣∣∣
ζ=ζ01
=
(
Gˆ
′′
1(y1(ζ))y
′
1(ζ)− Lˆ
′′
1(ζ)
)∣∣∣
ζ=ζ01
= −Lˆ′′1(ζ01 ) > 0, (3.46)
where we have used that y
′
1(ζ
0
1 ) = 0 for the second equality, and the fact that ζ
o
1 > yˇ1 for
the last inequality. Hence the function ζ 7→ Gˆ′1(y1(ζ)) − Lˆ′1(ζ) may only take zero values with
strictly positive derivative and (3.44), (3.45) hold. We therefore conclude that y1( · ) is monotonic
increasing in (yˆ2, y
∞
2 ).
The map (ξ, ζ) 7→ (y1(ξ), y2(ζ)) is a mapping (yˆ2, y∞2 ) × (0, yˆ1) 7→ (0, yˆ1) × (yˆ2, y∞2 ) and
we know from Theorem 3.4 that the curves y1( · ) and y2( · ) must meet at least once in the
rectangle (0, yˆ1) × (yˆ2, y∞2 ). The monotonicity of both y1 and y2 obtained here implies that
these can only meet once. Hence there exists a unique couple (y∗1, y∗2) solving y∗1 = y1(y2(y∗1))
and y∗2 = y2(y1(y∗2)) or equivalently (3.16).
Remark 3.8. The value of geometric analyses of optimal stopping problems, such as that in-
volved in this section, has been demonstrated in a number of recent papers. While beyond the
scope of the present analysis in which smooth fit plays a central role, it also applies in principle
to non-smooth payoff functions (see, for example, [11], [29]).
3.2 The case of an entrance boundary
In this section we assume that x is an entrance boundary and x is a natural boundary for X. This
setting includes for example CIR and Bessel processes for suitable choices of their parameters
(see for instance [20]). We will see that the methodology developed above may be extended to
this setting with minimal additional requirements. For the fundamental solutions φr and ψr we
have that (3.1), (3.2), (2.5) continue to hold if we replace
lim
x↓x
ψr(x) = 0 by lim
x↓x
ψr(x) > 0, (3.47)
lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0 by lim
x↓x
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
> −∞. (3.48)
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In this setting Lemma 3.1 holds in a slightly different form and some of the arguments require
trivial changes. In particular functions in Ai, i = 1, 2 may now have finite derivative at zero
with either positive or negative sign and we have
Lemma 3.9. Let H ∈ C2(I) with h(x) := (LX − r)h(x) and Hˆ as in (3.4).
i) If H ∈ A1 then for yˆ := Fr(xh), one has Hˆ convex on [0, yˆ), concave on (yˆ,∞) with
Hˆ(0+) = 0, also limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = +∞ and H is monotonic increasing on (yˆ,+∞); if in
addition infx∈I H(x) < 0 then Hˆ ′(0+) ∈ [−∞, 0) and Hˆ has a unique global minimum at
some y ∈ [0, yˆ).
ii) If H ∈ A2 then, for yˆ := Fr(xh), one has Hˆ concave on [0, yˆ), convex on (yˆ,∞) with
Hˆ(0+) = 0; moreover if Hˆ ′(0+) > 0 then Hˆ has a unique global maximum at some
y ∈ [0, yˆ) and limy→∞ Hˆ(y) = −∞; finally Hˆ is monotonic decreasing on (yˆ,+∞).
Note that the proof of the asymptotic behaviour as y → +∞ follows exactly the same
arguments as in Lemma 3.1 since the upper endpoint of I is again natural.
The main difference here compared to the previous section is that for G1 ∈ A1 we could have
Gˆ′1(0+) negative but finite (recall also that infx∈I G1(x) < 0 from Assumption 3.3). Because of
this we can now find Nash equilibria which did not arise when both boundaries were natural:
Proposition 3.10. Let Assumption 3.3 hold and let τ∞2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∞2 } be optimal
for (3.39). Then (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
(0 > ) Gˆ′1(0+) ≥
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.49)
with y∞2 = Fr(x∞2 ).
Proof. 1. First we show sufficiency. Suppose (3.49) holds and let P2 choose the stopping time
τ∞2 which is optimal in problem (3.39), so that P1 is faced with solving (3.41). Due to condition
(3.49), the largest convex minorant W1 of Gˆ1 on [0, y
∞
2 ] such that W1(y
∞
2 ) = Lˆ1(y
∞
2 ) is given
by the straight line starting from the origin and passing through (y∞2 , Lˆ1(y∞2 )). Therefore due
to strict convexity of Gˆ1 at zero, P1’s best reply to τ
∞
2 is the stopping time τ1(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 :
Xt = x} = +∞ a.s. (since the entrance boundary x is unattainable in finite time). Since τ∞2 is
also P2’s best reply to τ1(x) we have a Nash equilibrium.
2. We show necessity by contradiction. Suppose that (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium and
that (3.49) does not hold. The latter implies that an optimal stopping time for (3.41) may
be constructed (as in Appendix A.4) and is given by τ∞1 = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ x∞1 }. Here
x∞i = F
−1
r (y
∞
i ), i = 1, 2 and y
∞
i ∈ (0, yˆ1) solves L1(y∞1 , y∞2 ) = 0.
Therefore τ1(x) = +∞ a.s. and τ∞1 are both optimal for the optimal stopping problem (3.41)
(although τ∞1 does not necessarily lead to a Nash equilibrium), i.e.
Ex
[
e−rτ
∞
2 L1(Xτ∞2 )
]
(3.50)
= Ex
[
e−rτ
∞
1 G1(Xτ∞1 )1{τ∞1 <τ∞2 } + e
−rτ∞2 L1(Xτ∞2 )1{τ∞1 ≥τ∞2 }
]
.
We now use well known analytic representation formulae (see for instance eqs. (4.3)–(4.6) in
[11]) to express both sides above as
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y
y∞2
= Gˆ1(y
∞
1 )
(
y∞2 − y
y∞2 − y∞1
)
+ Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
(
y − y∞1
y∞2 − y∞1
)
, y ∈ (y∞1 , y∞2 ) (3.51)
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where we have set y = F−1r (x) everywhere. Simple algebra shows that (3.51) may be reduced
to the equivalent equation
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
=
Gˆ1(y
∞
1 )
y∞1
. (3.52)
Using the fact that L1(y∞1 , y∞2 ) = 0 in (3.52) one easily gets Gˆ1(y∞1 ) = Gˆ′1(y∞1 )y∞1 which is in
contradiction with the strict convexity of Gˆ1 on (0, yˆ1) and the proof is completed.
If limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞ then B̂ := {y > 0 : Gˆ′(0+)y = Lˆ1(y)} 6= ∅ as the straight line
r(y) := Gˆ′(0+)y will certainly cross Lˆ1 at least once. In a similar way we also introduce the
subset B := {y > yˆ2 : Gˆ′(0+)y = Lˆ1(y)} ⊂ B̂ and notice that for any y ∈ B the function L1( · , y)
cannot have a root in (0, yˆ1). Hence the tangency condition used in the proof of Theorem 3.4
to determine y1( · ) no longer applies at points of B. This makes the proof of the existence of
an equilibrium more technical in general and there may be cases where no equilibrium can be
found. However Proposition 3.5 continues to hold, and for specific choices of Li and Gi it may be
possible to check the existence of equilibria by studying (3.16) either analytically or numerically.
In the next proposition we make an assumption which is sufficient to rule out such techni-
calities and allows us to extend results of the previous section to the present setting.
Proposition 3.11. Let
Gˆ′1(0+) <
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.53)
and assume limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞ and yT ≤ yˆ2, where
yT := sup{y > 0 : Gˆ′(0+)y = Lˆ1(y)}. (3.54)
then Theorem 3.4 continues to hold when x is an entrance boundary.
Proof. Since Gˆ′1(0+)y does not cross Lˆ1 for y > yT , it must be that Lˆ1(y) − Gˆ′1(0+)y is either
strictly positive or strictly negative for y > yT but the latter is impossible otherwise (3.53) would
be violated. Then we must have Lˆ1(y)− Gˆ′1(0+)y > 0 for y > yˆ2 and hence for ζ > yˆ2, L1( · , ζ)
has a unique root y1(ζ) ∈ (0, yˆ1) by strict convexity of Gˆ1 and a simple geometric argument. In
fact one can always construct a unique straight line passing through (ζ, Lˆ1(ζ)) and tangent to
Gˆ1 at a point of (0, yˆ1).
Now steps 1 and 3 of the proof of Theorem 3.4 can be repeated in the same way and the
results follow.
Remark 3.12. 1. It is important to note that for the existence of an equilibrium we have
never examined whether or not Lˆ2 and Gˆ2 have maxima, nor the particular values of Gˆ
′
2 and
Lˆ′2 at zero (see the proof of Theorem 3.4). Instead we use these details to establish uniqueness
of the equilibrium. In fact in the setting of the above proposition and under the additional
assumption that Lˆ′2(0+) > 0 we find that Theorem 3.7 holds and we obtain uniqueness of the
Nash equilibrium.
2. Even though φr(x) ↑ +∞ as x ↓ x, when x is an entrance boundary condition (2.7) may
become more restrictive. For instance for a Bessel process with index ν = 1/2 (i.e. dimension
δ = 3) one has φr(x) ∼ 1/x as x → 0 (see [7] Appendix 2, pp. 638 and 654). In this case, in
order to address asymptotically linear costs we may relax (2.7) for G1 by requiring
lim
x↓x
G
φr
(x) = AG1 ∈ (−∞,+∞)
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then all the above arguments can be easily adapted to recover the existence and then uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium. We omit further details here because in the next section we provide a
complete analysis of a similar situation in the case when x is an exit boundary and (2.7) becomes
a serious restriction.
3.3 The case of an exit boundary
Here we extend the analysis carried out in the previous two sections by addressing the case
of a diffusion with a lower exit boundary x and an upper natural boundary x. We sketch the
proof, drawing out key differences with the previous arguments. Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (2.5)
continue to hold if we replace
lim
x↓x
φr(x) = +∞ by lim
x↓x
φr(x) < +∞, (3.55)
lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
= 0 by lim
x↓x
ψ′r(x)
S′(x)
> 0. (3.56)
We see that φr(x+) is now finite so that imposing (2.7) on the cost functions requires them
to vanish at x. Hence from now on we shall change the definition of the set A by replacing the
condition (2.7) by
lim
x↓x
H
φr
(x) = AH (3.57)
for some AH ∈ R depending on H. For any H ∈ A Dynkin’s formula, standard localisation and
(2.4) give
H(x) = AHφr(x)−W−1
[
φr(x)
∫ x
x
ψr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy + ψr(x)
∫ x
x
φr(y)h(y)m
′(y)dy
]
(3.58)
and for (H/φr)
′(x) we have expressions analogous to (2.11). We remark that the limit as x→ x
of (φ′r/S′) is again equal to −∞ as in the natural boundary case. Hence one can prove as in
(3.9)–(3.10) that
H ∈ A1 ⇒ Hˆ ′(0+) = −∞ and H ∈ A2 ⇒ Hˆ ′(0+) = +∞. (3.59)
Thanks to the latter observation one has that, under the new definition of A, Lemma 3.1
holds for Gˆi and Lˆi, i = 1, 2 in the same form with only the exception of the lower boundary
conditions: now indeed we have Gˆi(0+) = AGi and Lˆi(0+) = ALi . As one may expect the sign
of AG1 plays a crucial role in determining the existence of Nash equilibria and we study the two
possible cases below.
Proposition 3.13. If AG1 ≤ 0 then Theorem 3.4 holds when x is an exit boundary.
Proof. Condition (3.59) implies that the construction of an equilibrium follows as in the proof
of Theorem 3.4 up to trivial adjustments.
We now consider AG1 > 0. In this case there exists a unique straight line passing through
the origin and tangent to Gˆ1 at a point (yS , Gˆ1(yS)) where yS > 0 is the unique solution of
Gˆ1(yS) = ySGˆ
′
1(yS). (3.60)
Repeating arguments as in the proof of Proposition 3.10, up to straightforward modifications,
we obtain a similar result:
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Proposition 3.14. Let AG1 > 0 and let Assumption 3.3 hold with (3.57) in place of (2.7). Let
also τ∞2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ x∞2 } be optimal for (3.39). Then (+∞, τ∞2 ) is a Nash equilibrium
if and only if
Gˆ′1(yS) >
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.61)
with y∞2 = Fr(x∞2 ).
We now introduce yˆT := sup{y ≥ yS , Gˆ′1(yS)y = Lˆ1(y)} which will play a similar role as yT
of the previous section. Before stating the next result we recall that P2 will never stop optimally
in [0, xˆ2) (see the discussion in the first paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.4).
Proposition 3.15. Assume that AG1 > 0 and that
Gˆ′1(yS) ≤
Lˆ1(y
∞
2 )
y∞2
(3.62)
holds. Assume also yˆT < yˆ2 and limy→∞ Lˆ1(y) > −∞. Set xS := F−1r (yS) and σS := inf{t ≥
0 : Xxt ≥ xS} ∧ σI , then under Assumption 3.3 (with (3.57) in place of (2.7)) one has
a) if x ∈ (x, xS ] then the couple (σS , τ) is a Nash equilibrium for any τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ z},
z > xˆ2 (i.e. for any τ optimally chosen by P2);
b) if x > xS then Theorem 3.4 continues to hold when x is an exit boundary.
Proof. The proof is a simple repetition of arguments employed several times above in this paper
and therefore we will skip it here. The only difference here is that one should notice that for any
y0 > yˆ2 the convex minorant W1 of Gˆ1 passing through (y0, Lˆ1(y0)) has two straight portions:
i) the usual one connecting Lˆ1(y0) to Gˆ1 via the smooth-fit equation L1(y1(y0), y0) = 0 and ii)
the straight line rS(y) := Gˆ
′
1(yS) y for y ∈ [0, yS ].
Hence a) follows by observing that P1 will always stop prior to P2 (with probability one) at
σI ∧ σS and b) is obtained as in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
As for the case of natural boundaries, once again we obtain uniqueness of the equilibrium
under the additional assumptions of Theorem 3.7 both in the setting of the proposition above
and for AG1 ≤ 0. We remark that for AG1 ≤ 0 Proposition 3.5 holds in the same form whereas for
AG1 > 0 it holds in a slightly more complex form. We provide a full statement for completeness
but skip the proof as it is the same as the original one up to minor adjustments.
Proposition 3.16. Let all the assumptions of Proposition 3.15 hold. Let (y1, y2) ∈ (0, yˆ1) ×
(yˆ2,+∞) be a solution of (3.16) and for xi := F−1r (yi), i = 1, 2 set
τˆ1 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ x1}, τˆ2 := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x2}. (3.63)
Then for x ∈ [xS , x2) the couple (τˆ1, τˆ2) is a Nash equilibrium whereas for x ∈ (x, xS) the couple
(σS , τ) (with τ as in the statement of Prop. 3.15) is a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover the functions
v1(x) :=

p1ψr(x), x < x < xS ,
G1(x), xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m1ψr(x) + q1φr(x) x1 < x < x2,
L1(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.64)
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and
v2(x) :=

p2ψr(x), x < x < xS ,
L2(x), xS ≤ x ≤ x1,
m2ψr(x) + q2φr(x), x1 < x < x2
G2(x), x ≥ x2,
(3.65)
with mi, qi, i = 1, 2 as in Proposition 3.5, p1 := G1(xS)/ψr(xS) and p2 := L2(xS)/ψr(xS) are
the value functions of the two players, i.e. vi(x) = Ji(τ1, τ2;x), i = 1, 2. Also v1 ∈ C(I) with
v1 ∈W 2,∞loc (x, x2) and v2 ∈ C(I) with v2 ∈W 2,∞loc (x1, x).
A Appendix
A.1 Convexity of Hˆ
We show here that Hˆ of (3.4) is convex at y > 0 if and only if (LX − r)H(x) > 0 at x = F−1r (y).
We simply work out explicitly calculations indicated by [11, Sec. 6]. For y = Fr(x) it is obvious
that Hˆ ′(y) = g(x) with g(x) := (H/φr)′(x)/F ′r(x) so that Hˆ ′′(y) = g′(x)/F ′r(x). Since Fr is
strictly increasing, we only need to evaluate g′(x). This can be easily done by observing that
F ′r(x) =
(ψ′rφr − ψrφ′r)(x)
(φr)2(x)
= W
S′(x)
(φr)2(x)
and g(x) =
(H ′φr −Hφ′r)(x)
W S′(x)
from which we get
g′(x) =
φr(x)(S
′H ′′ − S′′H ′)(x)
W (S′)2(x)
− H(x)(S
′φ′′r − S′′φ′r)(x)
W (S′)2(x)
.
Now we use that S′′(x) = −2µ(x)S′(x)/σ2(x) to obtain
g′(x) =
2
W σ2(x)(S′)(x)
[
φr(x)LXH(x)−H(x)LXφr(x)
]
=
2φr(x)
W σ2(x)(S′)(x)
(LXH − rH)(x),
where in the last equality we have used that LXφr = rφr. The last expression proves the claim
and we remark that the result holds even if r = r(x) is state dependent.
A.2 Some remarks on state dependent discounting
Here we illustrate the case of a state dependent discount rate (r(Xt))t≥0. In this setting the
cost functionals (1.1) become:
Ji(τ1, τ2;x) := Ex
[
e−
∫ τi
0 r(Xt)dtGi(Xτi)1{τi<τj} + e
− ∫ τj0 r(Xt)dtLi(Xτj )1{τi≥τj}
]
, i = 1, 2, j 6= i.
(A-1)
In order to extend the methodology applied above, we make sufficient assumptions on r to
ensure the existence of strictly monotonic and strictly positive fundamental solutions φr, ψr to
the ODE
1
2σ
2(x)f ′′(x) + µ(x)f ′(x)− r(x)f(x) = 0, x ∈ I. (A-2)
In particular we assume that r(x) = r0 + r1(x) for x ∈ I, with r0 > 0 and r1(·) ≥ 0, bounded
from above and continuous in I. In this case we again have
Ex
[
e−
∫ τ(y)
0 r(Xt)dt
]
=

ψr(x)
ψr(y)
, x < y,
φr(x)
φr(y)
, x > y,
(A-3)
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for x, y ∈ I and τ(y) := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xt = y} (see [10], Prop. 2.1). The limits at the endpoints of
the domain I of functions φr, ψr, φ′r/S′ and ψ′r/S′ remain the same as in the previous sections,
depending on whether x is natural, entrance or exit. Instead of the expressions(2.5) we must
now consider their generalisation (see par. 9 and 10, Ch. 2 of [7])
ψ′r(b)
S′(b)
− ψ
′
r(a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)ψr(y)m
′(y)dy,
φ′r(b)
S′(b)
− φ
′
r(a)
S′(a)
=
∫ b
a
r(y)φr(y)m
′(y)dy, (A-4)
for x < a < b < x.
It is then easy to see that all the arguments that we have used for the construction of Nash
equilibria in the above sections can be repeated for state dependent discounting and all the
results carry over to this setting with no additional difficulties. In particular one should notice
that positivity and boundedness of r(·) allow us to find bounds similar to those that led to some
of our key inequalities (e.g. (3.7) and (3.10)); for example, setting r := supz∈I r(z) the last term
in (3.9) can be bounded from below as follows∫ xh−δ
x
φr(z)m
′(z)dz ≥ 1
r
∫ xh−δ
x
r(z)φr(z)m
′(z)dz =
1
r
(φ′r(xh − δ)
S′(xh − δ) −
φ′r(x)
S′(x)
)
and the rest of the proof follows in the same way also with state dependent discounting.
We also remark that the argument used to infer convexity and concavity of the transformed
functions Hˆ in Lemma 3.1 and 3.9 hold in the same form, i.e. Hˆ(y) is strictly convex if and only
if 12σ
2(x)H ′′(x) + µ(x)H ′(x)− r(x)H(x) > 0 with y = Fr(x).
A.3 Two Useful Optimal Stopping Problems
In this section we study two optimal stopping problems in which a stopper aims at choosing an
F-stopping time minimising a given expected reward. These optimal stopping problems are the
building blocks of our construction of Nash equilbria for the nonzero-sum optimal stopping game
(2.6) (see Theorem 3.4). In contrast to [11] we characterise the value functions as the largest
convex minorants of the reward functions with no conditions on their sign as in, for example,
[27].
A.3.1 A First Optimal Stopping Problem
Recall Definition 2.3 and consider a function G ∈ A2. Denote by xˆ ∈ I the unique point at
which LXG − rG changes its sign and take xo ∈ I with xo < xˆ. Let us introduce the infinite
time horizon optimal stopping problem with value function
Vo(x) := inf
τ∈T
Ex
[
e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ<τo} + ϑe
−rτo1{τ≥τo}
]
, (A-5)
where ϑ < G(xo) and τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ xo}.
Set yo := Fr(xo), with Fr(·) as in (3.3), and define the function
Q(y) :=
{
ϑ
φr(y)
, 0 < y ≤ yo,
Gˆ(y), y > yo,
(A-6)
with Gˆ(y) :=
(
G/φr
) ◦ F−1r (y). For yˆ := Fr(xˆ) we argue as in Section A.1 of this appendix and
obtain that Gˆ is strictly concave in [0, yˆ) and strictly convex in (yˆ,∞). Let us then assume that
there is a straight line ro(·) which passes through the point (yo, Q(yo)) and is tangent to Q at a
point y∗ > yˆ (this can be easily proven but we do not need it here and we leave it to the reader).
This line is expressed as
ro(y) = my + q, y > 0, (A-7)
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with {
m := Q(y∗)−Q(yo)y∗−yo ,
q := Q(yo)−myo.
(A-8)
By the convexity of Gˆ (and therefore of Q) in (yˆ,+∞) the point y∗ is determined as the unique
y > yˆ that solves the tangency equation
Q(y)−Q(yo)
y − yo = Q
′(y). (A-9)
Proposition A.1. Let G ∈ A2. Assume there exists y∗ > yˆ solving (A-9) (which is then
unique). Recall (A-7), (A-8), define x∗ := F−1r (y∗) and the functions
W (y) :=

ϑ
φr(y)
, 0 < y ≤ yo
my + q, yo < y ≤ y∗
Gˆ(y), y ≥ y∗,
(A-10)
and
V˜o(x) := φr(x)W (Fr(x)) =

ϑ, x < x ≤ xo
mψr(x) + qφr(x), xo < x ≤ x∗
G(x), x∗ ≤ x < x.
(A-11)
Then one has V˜o ≡ Vo and τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x∗} is optimal for problem (A-5).
Proof. If x ≤ xo there is clearly nothing to prove. Therefore, take x > xo and notice by
(A-11) that (LX − r)V˜o(x) = 0 if x ∈ (xo, x∗). Moreover, by Section A.1 we also have that
(LX − r)V˜o(x) ≥ 0 if x ∈ (x∗, x), since y∗ > yˆ and Gˆ is convex in (yˆ,∞). Also, by construction,
V˜o(x∗) = G(x∗), V˜
′
o (x∗) = G
′
(x∗), V˜o(xo) = ϑ and V˜o ≤ G, for any x > xo. Since V˜o ∈
W 2,∞loc ((x0, x)) we can apply Itoˆ-Tanaka’s formula to the process (e
−rtV˜o(Xxt ))t≥0 on the time
interval [0, τ ∧ τo], for arbitrary τ ∈ T , and obtain
V˜o(x) ≤ Ex
[
e−rτ∧τo V˜o(Xτ∧τo)
]
≤ Ex
[
e−rτG(Xτ )1{τ<τo} + ϑe
−rτo1{τ≥τo}
]
and hence V˜o ≤ Vo. Then repeating the argument with τ = τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ x∗} we find
V˜o(x) = Ex
[
e−rτ∗G(Xτ∗)1{τ∗<τo}+ϑe
−rτo1{τ∗≥τo}
]
and therefore V˜o = Vo and τ∗ is optimal.
A.4 A Second Optimal Stopping Problem
We take the same setup as in section A.3.1, with the modifications that G ∈ A1, xo > xˆ,
τo := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≥ xo} and
Q(y) :=
{
Gˆ(y), 0 < y < yo,
ϑ
φr(y)
, y ≥ yo,
(A-12)
and taking y∗ as the unique y ∈ (0, yˆ) (if it exists) solving (A-9). Arguments completely symmet-
ric to those developed in the previous section then allow us to prove the following proposition.
Proposition A.2. Let G ∈ A1. Assume there exists y∗ < yˆ solving (A-9) (which is then
unique). Then, for x∗ := F−1r (y∗) the function
V˜o(x) :=

G(x), x < x < x∗,
mψr(x) + qφr(x), x∗ < x < xo,
ϑ, xo ≤ x < x,
(A-13)
is such that V˜o ≡ Vo and the stopping time τ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Xxt ≤ x∗} is optimal for problem
(A-5).
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